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2EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report evaluates the determination of life sentences in the light of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and the associated jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights. The principal conclusion is that current Irish law does not comply with 
European human rights law. 
A mandatory sentence of life imprisonment is imposed on offenders convicted of murder or 
treason. In addition, life imprisonment is the maximum penalty available for other serious 
crimes such as manslaughter, rape and certain drug offences. In the case of the latter offences 
the life sentence is discretionary i.e. a court is entitled but not obliged to impose that sanction. 
Irish courts have adopted proportionality as the cardinal principle underlying sentencing 
practice. Sentences must be proportionate to the culpability of the defendant. The courts have 
rejected the idea that a sentence may reflect preventative concerns: in particular, the Court of 
Criminal Appeal has ruled that it is not permissible to impose a discretionary life sentence on 
an offender on the grounds that he or she represents a continuing threat to the public. In 
practice, the only life sentences in Ireland are those that are imposed on offenders convicted 
of murder. 
It is widely acknowledged that a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment will not be 
incarcerated for the rest of his or her natural life. This observation is reinforced by official 
and quasi-official pronouncements by the Parole Board and the Minister for Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform. Under Irish law the Minister enjoys the power to order the temporary 
release of prisoners, including life sentence prisoners, under section 2(1) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1960. The Minister acts on the advice of the Parole Board, a non-statutory body
but, crucially, the Minister is not obliged to follow the Board’s advice. The courts have 
consistently held that the question of release is an executive matter and that the Minister 
enjoys a “wide discretion” in this regard: the courts have indicated that they would overturn a 
refusal to order temporary release only on the limited grounds that the refusal was arbitrary, 
capricious or unjust. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has suggested that it is constitutionally 
possible to enact legislation providing for the regular review of sentences by a parole board.
Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights guarantees the right to liberty and 
security. Under Article 5(4) a person enjoys the right to have the lawfulness of his or her 
detention reviewed by a court and, if the detention is found to be unlawful, to be released. 
The European Court of Human Rights has invoked Article 5 in cases of life sentence 
prisoners and a detailed picture has emerged. A life sentence prisoner is entitled to a frequent 
and speedy review of his or her case by a court or “court like” (i.e. quasi-judicial) body. 
Where a review is conducted by a “court like” entity, the body reviewing the detention must 
be invested with the power to determine the lawfulness of the prisoner’s detention: it is not 
sufficient that it acts in an advisory capacity. The review body must be independent of the 
executive and must adopt appropriate procedures in its hearings. Whether a review is 
sufficiently speedy or frequent is considered in the light of the circumstances of the particular 
case. In determining the lawfulness of the prisoner’s continued incarceration both domestic 
law and the Convention are relevant. Prolonged indefinite detention is only justifiable on 
grounds of risk and dangerousness and the review must be sufficiently broad to allow a 
determination as to whether the grounds for continued detention still operate. 
3It is contended in this report that Irish law is incompatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights in a number of respects. Firstly, the question of release in Ireland is an 
executive matter whereas the European Convention of Human Rights guarantees a right of 
review by a court or “court like” body. Secondly, the Parole Board is not a “court like” body, 
as that concept is understood in European human rights law. The Parole Board’s role is 
merely advisory but the Convention demands that the review body has the power to 
determine cases. Thirdly, the Irish courts will quash an executive decision on release on the 
limited grounds that it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable; the Convention requires a 
broader form of review that is not satisfied by the domestic remedy of judicial review.
In conclusion, it is suggested that the enactment of legislation placing the Parole Board on a 
statutory footing and assigning to it the function of determining applications for temporary 
release would bring Irish law into harmony with the European Convention on Human Rights.
4I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Unlike a sentence of imprisonment for a term of years a life sentence is by its very nature 
indeterminate.1 Thus, while a person who is sentenced to a fixed term knows the date on 
which he can expect to be released the life sentence prisoner has no such guarantee.2 In 
Ireland, the current position is that his or her release is a matter for the executive, in the form 
of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, to decide. The Minister in turn is 
advised by the non-statutory Parole Board but, crucially, the Minister is not bound by that 
advice: the question of release of a prisoner is for the Minister alone.
This report evaluates the current legal position governing the release of life sentence 
prisoners in the light of human rights standards, in particular the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has in a series of 
rulings established the entitlement to a speedy and regular review of life sentences by an 
independent and impartial body. That Court has also identified the type of procedures that 
should be adopted. It will be contended in this report that current Irish law fails to accord 
with the standards required by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and that reform is necessary. 
As it happens the bulk of the European Court’s case law emanates from the United Kingdom. 
An appreciation of the development of UK law and practice is necessary in order fully to 
appreciate the ECtHR decisions, and the opportunity is taken in this report briefly to outline 
developments in our neighbouring jurisdictions.3 It will be seen that the current law 
governing life sentences in England and Wales has in large part been shaped by judgments of 
the ECtHR and domestic decisions implementing ECHR standards into national law. 
1. Life Sentences in Ireland.
Since the abolition of the death penalty in 19904 a life sentence is the most severe sanction 
that the law imposes. By definition those sentenced to life imprisonment have been found 
guilty of the most serious offences in the criminal calendar and, at first sight, it might seem 
that their predicament should not elicit too much concern or sympathy. Given the gravity of 
their offending the law has selected a life sentence as the punishment due and this is matched 
by the popular sentiment that “life should mean life”. On this view, the possibility of release 
is a privilege rather than a right and, correspondingly, it might be concluded that life 
prisoners who have not been released have little cause for complaint. 
However, things are not as they seem. In fact, most life sentence prisoners will be released at 
some stage during their sentences, a practice that can be said to give rise to a corresponding 
1
 Baker, E., “Dangerousness, Rights and Criminal Justice” (1993) 56 Modern Law Review, 528 at 533 writes: 
“The detention of life sentence prisoners is qualitatively distinct from that of the rest of the prison population in 
that the duration of the detention is indeterminate and consequently there is no date at which life sentence 
prisoners are entitled to be released. In this sense their position is more prejudicial than that of other prisoners.” 
By the nineteenth century, life sentences replaced capital punishment as a mode of punishment for specified 
criminal offences.
2
 See The People v Cahill [1980] IR 8 at 12 where Henchy J observed, albeit in a somewhat different context: 
“[i]t is desirable that both the prison authorities and the prisoner should be in a position to plan for the date of 
release. The pre-release rehabilitative procedures necessary to erase the problems inherent in the return of the 
prisoner to society require to be set in motion and programmed with a particular date of release in view.”
3
 The United Kingdom consists of three jurisdictions, namely England and Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. However, since most of the ECtHR cases originated in England this report will concentrate on English 
developments and will note divergences in the law of the other two jurisdictions where relevant.
4
 Criminal Justice Act 1990, s 1; also Art 15.5.2° of the Constitution (inserted by amendment in 2002).
5expectation that such prisoners will qualify for release at some point. That expectation is 
reinforced by recent pronouncements by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
and by the Parole Board as to the minimum period that life sentence prisoners should serve 
before they might be considered for release:5 the corollary is that once an appropriate period 
has been served a prisoner would become eligible to have his case for release considered. 
Moreover, the legislative stipulation that prisoners convicted of treason and certain forms of 
murder should serve a minimum of 40 years6 is based on the assumption that a system of 
release operates in favour of life sentence prisoners.
In effect, the indeterminate nature of the life sentence is moderated by the exercise of the 
executive power to release life sentence prisoners. Once that possibility is conceded the 
regime governing release is crucial both in terms of fairness and penal policy. Broadly 
speaking, the thrust of human rights law is to the effect that the question of releasing a life 
sentence prisoner should not be arbitrary or unreasonable. To this end the decision to release 
should be taken by an independent and impartial body: and a member of the executive (i.e. a 
government minister) lacks that vital quality. Moreover, life sentence prisoners should be 
afforded speedy and regular reviews of their continued incarceration in order to determine 
whether the circumstances that justify their imprisonment continue to operate. The ECtHR 
has also indicated the grounds on which the continued detention of a life sentence prisoner 
may be justified. Influenced no doubt by English domestic law and the practice of setting 
tariffs on life sentences,7 the Court has accepted that imprisonment may be warranted either 
by punitive and deterrent considerations or by the need to protect the public.  
In general, the appropriate sentence is imposed by the trial judge at the conclusion of the 
criminal proceedings. In Irish law the principle of proportionality governs the sentence that 
will be imposed:8 that principle insists that the relevant sentence is proportionate to the 
culpability of the defendant, taking into consideration both aggravating and mitigating factors 
associated with the defendant’s criminal transgressions. For most criminal offences, trial 
judges enjoy a wide measure of discretion when imposing sentence in individual cases, 
subject only to the statutory maximum sentence that is prescribed for the particular offence. 
Life sentences fall into two categories. For some criminal offences, most notably treason and 
murder, a mandatory life sentence is prescribed by law.9 In these circumstances, the trial 
judge’s hands are tied: he or she enjoys no discretion in the matter but is legally compelled to 
5
 See the remarks of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 24 March 2006 
(http://www.justice.ie/80256E01003A02CF/vWeb/pcJUSQ6N7FGB-en: accessed on 7 Nov 2006): “… nobody
[convicted of murder] should expect even in the absence of aggravating factors and where guilt has been 
admitted, remorse shown, good behaviour demonstrated during imprisonment and a capacity for rehabilitation 
proven that there is a likelihood that he or she will be set at liberty on licence at least before the expiry of 12 to 
14 years … I can tell you that, of those prisoners serving life sentences who have been released over the past ten 
years, the average sentence served in prison is approximately thirteen and a half years.” See also Chairman’s 
Foreword, The Parole Board, Annual Report (2005) p 3.
6
 Criminal Justice Act 1990, s 4.
7
 Discussed further in text at fnn 22-45.
8
 Discussed further in text at fnn 123-126; see also Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union: “[t]he severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.”
9
 Criminal Justice Act 1990, s 2. Juveniles (i.e. persons aged under 17 years) who are convicted of murder might 
be sentenced either to a determinate term or to indefinite detention: see O’Malley, T., Sentencing Law and 
Practice (2nd ed, Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 2006) pp 394-396; also Walsh, D., Juvenile Justice (Dublin: 
Thomson Round Hall, 2005) pp 155-157.
6pass the life sentence that the law demands.10 The mandatory life sentence is an inflexible 
instrument, as it cannot take account of the culpability of the particular offender and, to this 
extent, it is difficult to reconcile with the principle of proportionality.11 Thus, the mandatory 
life sentence is imposed for all murders ranging from the most heinous (e.g. serial killings) to
those that some might feel merit less condemnation (mercy killing of a loved one is often 
cited in this regard). On the other hand, it may be contended that the mandatory life sentence 
amounts to a legislative assessment of the culpability associated with all murders and a 
corresponding judgment that it is not appropriate to draw a distinction between different 
types of murder. It might further be suggested that a mandatory life sentence is purely 
punitive (and perhaps deterrent) and eschews other sentencing goals such as rehabilitation, 
and significantly, incapacitation. In a word, the mandatory life sentence may be taken to 
reflect the sentiment that “murder is murder is murder” and deserves the severest punishment 
without mitigation. However, as noted above, these considerations are not borne out in 
practice.  Most life sentence prisoners are released eventually and this, coupled with official 
or quasi-official pronouncements, creates an expectation that they will qualify for release. 
The second category consists of discretionary life sentences where a maximum sentence of 
life imprisonment is provided for by law. Discretionary life sentences are prescribed for a 
number of serious offences including manslaughter, rape, rape under section 4,12 aggravated 
sexual assault,13 committing a sexual act on a child less than 15 years of age,14 causing 
serious harm,15 syringe attacks,16 false imprisonment,17 robbery,18 aggravated burglary19 and 
drugs offences. In these cases the sentencing judge is entitled, but not obliged, to pass a life 
sentence – hence the discretionary element. Discretionary life sentences are more easily 
reconciled with the principle of proportionality since the particular sentence imposed can be 
calibrated to match the culpability of the offender and the circumstances of the offence.20 In 
such cases the sentencing judge enjoys the wide measure of discretion that is allowed in 
sentencing generally. 
As far as discretionary life sentences are concerned Irish courts have indicated that they are 
governed by the principle of proportionality and it has been ruled impermissible to include a 
10
 Schone, J.M., “The Hardest Case of All: Myra Hindley, Life Sentences, and the Rule of Law” (2000) 28 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 273 at 274 writes: “This sentence is the only permissible in 
English law following a conviction for murder. After sentencing the trial judge makes a recommendation as to 
the period of years the prisoner should serve to satisfy the requirements of retribution and deterrence (the 
‘tariff’). The Lord Chief Justice, England’s senior criminal law judge, then adds his or her comments and 
recommendation, if different from the trial judge.”
11
 See O’Malley, T., Sentencing Law and Practice (2nd ed, Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 2006) p 536; also 
O’Malley, T., “Sentencing Murderers: the Case for Relocating Discretion” (1995) 5 Irish Criminal Law Journal
31. The Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Sentencing (Dublin, 1993) p 311 queries whether the 
lack of judicial involvement that a mandatory sentence entails a breach of fair procedures in that it deprives the 
accused of a right to be heard in the matter of penalty. See also van Zyl Smit, D., “Life Imprisonment: Recent 
Issues in National and International Law” (2006) 29 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 405.
12
 Criminal Law (Rape)(Amendment) Act 1990, s 4.
13
 Criminal Law (Rape)(Amendment) Act 1990, s 3.
14
 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006, s 2.
15
 Non-fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997. s 4.
16
 Non-fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997, s 6.
17
 Non-fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997, s 15.
18
 Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001, s 14.
19
 Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001, s 13.
20
 See further O’Malley, T., Sentencing Law and Practice (2nd ed, Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 2006) pp 114-
115.
7preventative element in such a sentence.21 It may be concluded from this proposition that the 
imposition by an Irish court of a discretionary life sentence is designed exclusively to reflect 
the offender’s culpability and the gravity of the offence. The appellate courts have ruled that 
a sentencing judge may not include an element of incapacitation, designed to protect the 
public from a potentially dangerous offender, in such a sentence. In theory, at least, a life 
sentence in Ireland is predominantly punitive in nature.
2. Sentencing in England and Wales.
As is the case in Ireland, the life sentence in England and Wales does not necessarily result in 
incarceration for life.22 That said, the legal regime governing life sentences in England and 
Wales contrasts significantly with that which pertains in Ireland. In England and Wales 
sentencing judges are provided with statutory guidance in the imposition of discretionary life 
sentences and by the practice of setting a tariff, a minimum period of incarceration that must 
be served before a prisoner can be considered for parole.
Like the position in Ireland, English law traditionally confined the mandatory life sentence to 
murder.23 However, in the 1990s English sentencing law moved from a position based 
principally on punitive considerations to one that incorporates a significant element of 
incapacitation. This development was based on concerns of public protection and was 
designed to ensure that potentially dangerous offenders were removed from circulation for an 
indefinite period. A series of enactments introduced extended sentences and “longer than 
commensurate” sentence.24 The Crimes (Sentencing) Act 1997 [UK] introduced the concept 
of automatic life sentences, which were imposed for certain types of re-offending. Judicial 
discretion was largely circumscribed and the automatic life sentence was mandatory unless 
“exceptional circumstances”, a phrase that was narrowly interpreted by English courts,25 were 
found to be present. Nevertheless, concerns about the compatibility of automatic life 
sentences with the ECHR persisted26 and, despite initially favourable judicial 
pronouncements,27 the application of such sentences was curtailed by the decision in R v 
Offen (No 2) to the effect that an “unduly restrictive”28 approach to exceptional circumstances 
would be incompatible with the Convention. 
21
 Discussed further in text at fnn 127-139.
22
 The English position is explained by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, (Cmd.8932, 1953), at 
para. 614: “[p]ersons serving life imprisonment have died in prison before a definite term has been set to their 
sentences, but there is no case recorded in which it has been decided that a person shall be kept in penal 
servitude until he dies.” See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 
531 at 549-550, per Lord Mustill: “The sentence of life imprisonment is also unique in that the words, which the 
judge is required to pronounce, do not mean what they say. Whilst in a very small minority of cases the prisoner 
is in the event confined for the rest of his natural life, this is not the usual or intended effect of a sentence of life 
imprisonment…” Samuels, A., “In Denial of Murder: No Parole” (2003) 42(2) Howard Journal of Criminal 
Justice, 176 at 176: “[t]he concept of the ‘whole life’ sentence, never to be released, seems to be becoming 
increasingly difficult to justify, as refusal of parole must now be based only on continuing risk to the public.” 
Nevertheless, a whole life tariff was upheld in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hindley
[2001] 1 AC 410.
23
 The House of Lords held the mandatory sentence for murder to be compatible with the ECHR: see R v 
Lichniak; R v Pyrah [2003] 1 AC 903. The ECtHR has held that the indeterminate sentence of detention during 
Her Majesty's pleasure was neither unlawful nor arbitrary and accordingly did not breach Article 5(1) ECHR: V 
v United Kingdom [1999] ECHR 24888/94.
24
 Criminal Justice Act 1991 [UK]; Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 [UK].
25
 See e.g. R v Kelly [1999] 2 Cr App R (S) 176; R v Offen (No 1) [2000] 1 Cr App R (S) 565. 
26
 See Thomas “Incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights: Its Impact on Sentencing” in The 
Human Rights Act and the Criminal Justice and Regulatory Process (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999) pp 82-83.
27
 See R v Drew [2003] 4 All ER 557.  
28
 [2001] 2 All ER 154 at 171, per Lord Wolfe CJ.
8Automatic life sentences were abandoned by Westminster in 200329 but discretionary life 
sentences may still be invoked to serve a preventative purpose. Such sentences will be 
imposed if the offender poses a serious risk to the public. The current position is summarised 
by Easton and Piper:30
“To impose a discretionary life sentence the court must first find the crime to have been 
grave and the offender to have been suffering from mental instability. It must then 
assess the risk posed by the offender and decide that he will probably re-offend and be 
a danger to the public for some (unforeseeable) time.”
The imposition of discretionary life sentences has been confined to sexual and violent 
offences: in the main they are imposed for manslaughter and rape.31 The Criminal Justice Act 
2003 [UK] currently governs the imposition of life sentences, imprisonment for public 
protection and extended sentences.32 As with the legislation that preceded it, the 2003 Act 
significantly curtails judicial discretion: once the statutory criteria are found to exist the 
sentencing judge must impose the relevant sentence.33 Moreover, the 2003 Act involves a 
marked departure from the principle of proportionality, at least to the extent that that 
principle concentrates of the culpability of the particular offender.34
Where a life sentence or a sentence of imprisonment for public protection is imposed the 
court must specify a minimum term to be served. The latter requirement is a continuation of 
the practice of specifying tariffs in the case of life sentences.35 Lord Windlesham explained 
the development of the tariff in sentencing practice in the following terms:36
29
 Criminal Justice Act 2003 [UK], s 303.
30 Sentencing and Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p 141.
31
 Smith, “Psychiatric Evidence and Discretionary Life Sentences” (1998) 9(1) Journal of Forensic Psychiatry
17 cited in Easton and Piper op cit p 142.
32
 See Ashworth, A. and Player, E., “Criminal Justice Act 2003: The Sentencing Provisions” (2005) 68(5) 
Modern Law Review 822; Thomas, D., “The Criminal Justice Act 2003: Custodial Sentences” [2004] Criminal 
Law Review 702.
33
 Criminal Justice Act 2003 [UK], s 225(1)(b) provides that the court must impose such a sentence where it “is 
of the opinion that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the 
commission by [the offender] of further specified offences.” See Ashworth, A., Sentencing and Criminal Justice
(4th ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p 210.
34
 See von Hirsh, A. and Roberts, J.V., “Legislating Sentencing Principles: The Provisions of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 relating to Sentencing Purposes and the Role of Previous Convictions” [2004] Criminal Law 
Review, 639 at 652 conclude that: “By calling upon sentencers to take into account multiple (and potentially 
conflicting) sentencing aims, and by a giving progressively larger role to an offender's prior convictions, the 
Criminal Justice Act could, to a significant degree, move sentencing in England and Wales away from a model 
based on the principle of proportionality. The Act attempts in one provision to preserve proportionate 
sentencing, while in another seemingly giving an enhanced role to a variety of other sentencing aims, and 
calling for progressively increasing punishments for recidivist offending. It is significant that this is occurring 
when, as noted earlier, several other common law jurisdictions have strengthened the role of proportionality in 
sentencing. How dramatic will the shift from proportionate sentencing be? Much will depend upon the character 
and quality of the sentencing guidelines developed by the Sentencing Guidelines Council. Whether the courts 
are provided with workable and fair norms for sentencing now depends to an important degree on the Council's 
work.”
35 The 2003 Act uses the expression “minimum term” rather than the “tariff” (this term was preferred by the 
Sentencing Advisory Panel): Sentencing Advisory Panel (Minimum Terms in Murder Cases: The Panel’s 
Advice to the Court of Appeal, 2002), para. 2.
36
 Lord Windlesham “Life Sentences: The Paradox of Indeterminacy” [1989] Criminal Law Review, 244 at 256 
(internal references omitted). See also Padfield, N., “Tariffs in Murder Cases”  [2002] Criminal Law Review, 
192 at 193 who writes: “The word ‘tariff’ probably started to be used in Home Office ‘jargon’ in relation to life
sentences, long before the courts started to use the term in a new sense, simply to mean the Home Office’s 
9“The emergence of a specific tariff for lifers is a peculiarly English development, never 
introduced as part of a logical scheme for deciding upon the amount of time to be spent 
in custody by offenders convicted of the most serious crimes. Born of uncertain 
parentage, it took on a life of its own in 1983, being almost unnoticed at first, but before 
long coming to dominate the whole complex administrative structure of life 
imprisonment. It should be no surprise that these procedures have attracted the attention 
both of the European Commission of Human Rights and the House of Lords. A Select 
Committee of the House of Lords which was set up in July 1988, is considering the 
scope and definition of the crime of murder, in Scotland as well as in England and 
Wales, and the disputed question whether imprisonment for life should remain the 
mandatory rather than the maximum penalty for murder.”
The then Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, first introduced the tariff period of a sentence in 
November 1983.37 The tariff did not signify the total sentence imposed by the trial court but 
was the minimum period of imprisonment to be served by the prisoner that was considered 
necessary to meet the requirements of retribution and deterrence, before being considered by 
the Parole Board for release on licence. The tariff reflected the punitive38 element of the life 
sentence with the remainder of that sentence being justified on grounds of public protection. 
At first, different arrangements for the setting of the tariff operated for mandatory and 
discretionary life sentences. Where the latter were concerned the sentencing judge set the 
tariff. In R v Mansell, Lord Taylor CJ explained that:39
“In theory, someone who was addicted to conduct which could cause serious harm to 
members of the public might need to be prevented from doing so for a very long time. In the 
ultimate case, an indeterminate sentence might be necessary where the harm was likely to be 
very serious and the predilection for indulging in such conduct looked likely to continue for 
an indefinite time. The sentencer in each individual case had to try to balance the need to 
protect the public on the one hand with the need to look at the totality of the sentence and see 
that it was not out of all proportion with the nature of the offending.”
However, in the case of mandatory life sentences the Home Secretary determined the tariff, 
having taken account of the recommendations of the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice.40
estimate of what a lifer should serve. Since the 19th century, both mandatory and discretionary life prisoners 
have normally been released at some stage, by executive discretion. There is conflicting evidence about the 
length of time that prisoners served in the late 19th century, but it would seem that most were detained for 
between 15 and 20 years. In the early years of the 20th century, most prisoners were released after serving 
between 10 and 20 years. In the succeeding decades it became the practice to treat lifers ‘as for 20 years’, i.e. 
releasing them after 15 years as they would have been had they been sentenced to 20 years. During the Second 
World War, the rate of remission for determinate sentence prisoners was increased from a quarter to a third.  It 
became the practice to detain the prisoner ‘as for 12 years’, i.e. ‘for eight actual years in cases where there were 
no grounds for clemency’. At this time there was clearly some sort of ‘grading’ of offences” (citing Home Office 
to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949)).
37
 Shute, S., “Punishing Murders: Release Procedures and the ‘Tariff’, 1953-2004” [2004] Criminal Law 
Review, 873 at 881.
38
 In fact, English pronouncements on the tariff speak of its satisfying retributive and deterrent requirements, a 
position that is potentially self-contradictory: it assumes punishment and deterrence demand the same sentence 
whereas those features might well suggest very different periods of imprisonment.
39
 (1994) 15 Cr App R (S) 771 at 772. See also R v Edward John Wilkinson and Others (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 
105 at 109, where Lord Lane C.J. stated: “[I]t is sometimes impossible to say when that danger will subside, and 
therefore an indeterminate sentence is required, so that the prisoner’s progress may be monitored by those who 
have him under their supervision in prison, and so that he will be kept in custody only so long as public safety 
may be jeopardised by his being let loose at large.”
10
This practice, which was consolidated in section 29 of the Crimes (Sentences) Act 1997 
[UK], raised concerns about whether it was appropriate that a member of the executive 
should determine what in effect is a sentence. As Padfield observed: 41
“Where a tariff is appropriate, it should be a true tariff, imposed by the judiciary, which 
cannot be increased. Decisions about punishment should be taken by judges. Decisions 
about risk assessment and release should be taken by the Parole Board…that leaves no 
room for the Home Secretary…”
Nevertheless, the separate regime for mandatory life sentences was based on the theory that, 
unlike its discretionary counterpart, the mandatory life sentence was purely punitive. This 
distinction was to shape early ECtHR decisions on life sentences42 but eventually that court 
came to realise that there was no practical distinction between the two forms of life 
sentence.43 In time English law came to share this view of the matter. In R (Anderson) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department,44 the House of Lords bowed to the weight of 
ECtHR jurisprudence and concluded that the fixing of the tariff was legally indistinguishable 
from imposing a sentence. It followed that Article 6 ECHR applied and that the tariff should 
be set by a court (“an independent and impartial tribunal”) rather than by the Home 
Secretary. Accordingly, the House of Lords declared section 29 of the Crimes (Sentences) 
Act 1997 [UK] to be incompatible with the ECHR. Following the decision in Anderson, the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 [UK] transferred the function of setting the tariff, or “minimum 
term” as it is now known, to sentencing judges, a development that has the advantages of 
being transparent and being undertaken by the official who is most familiar with the 
offender’s circumstances.45
40
 Schone, J.M., “The Hardest Case of All: Myra Hindley, Life Sentences, and the Rule of Law” (2000) 28 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 273 at 274 writes: “This sentence is the only permissible in 
English law following a conviction for murder. After sentencing the trial judge makes a recommendation as to 
the period of years the prisoner should serve to satisfy the requirements of retribution and deterrence (the 
‘tariff’). The Lord Chief Justice, England’s senior criminal law judge, then adds his or her comments and 
recommendation, if different from the trial judge.” 
41
 Padfield, N., “Fixing the Tariff, and the Length of Her Majesty’s Pleasure” (1997) 56 Cambridge Law 
Journal, 477 at 480.
42 Wynne v United Kingdom (1995) 19 EHRR 333.
43 Stafford v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 32. In V v United Kingdom (1999) 30 EHRR 121 the ECtHR 
ruled that the setting of the tariff for children who are detained at Her Majesty’s pleasure (i.e. indefinite 
detention) should be undertaken by judges, not by the Home Secretary. The House of Lords had earlier held the 
fixed tariff imposed in applicant’s case to be unlawful on the different ground that the Home Secretary was 
obliged to keep the minimum term under review: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Venables [1998] AC 407. The pre-Stafford position in England is analysed in Padfield, N., Beyond the Tariff: 
Human Rights and the Release of Life Sentence Prisoners (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2002), 
44
 [2003] AC 1.
45
 Thomas, D., “The Criminal Justice Act 2003: Custodial Sentences” [2004] Criminal Law Review, 702 at 703
observes: “[t]hese are welcome developments. The new system places the decision on the minimum term 
exactly where it belongs--in open court and within the judicial process. In future, the minimum term ordered to 
be served by any offender will be public knowledge. It will be fixed by a judge who has seen the offender and 
who is familiar with the details of the case, who has heard appropriate mitigation on his behalf, and whose 
decision will be fully articulated.”
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II. ECHR REQUIREMENTS
The European Convention on Human Rights46 was designed to protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The Convention established the European Court of Human Rights and 
residents of signatory states who claim that a state party or an emanation of a state has 
infringed their rights under the ECHR, may petition the ECtHR for redress. 
Since the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, the Convention 
enjoys an enhanced profile in Irish domestic law.47 The jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights has a greater purchase in domestic proceedings: Irish courts are now 
required to take judicial notice of declarations, decisions, advisory opinions and judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights and to take “due account” of the principles established 
by those instruments.48 The courts are enjoined, where possible, to interpret national law in a 
manner that is compatible with the ECHR49 and the superior courts are authorised to issue a 
declaration of incompatibility where a national law falls foul of the ECHR.50
1.  The Relevant Provisions.
A number of provisions of the ECHR have a bearing on the issue of determining life 
sentences. Article 5 ECHR, entitled “right to liberty and security”, inter alia reads:
“(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law:
a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court…”
Article 5(1)(a) permits the lawful detention of prisoners sentenced in accordance with the 
domestic law of a state. However, the continued detention of a prisoner may constitute a 
violation of Article 5(1)(a) if the proper procedures for the periodic review of that detention 
of the prisoner have not been put in place.
Review of the continued indeterminate detention of prisoners is governed by Article 5(4), 
which reads:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a 
court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.” 
46
 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, November 4, 1950.
47
 See remarks of Kearns J in Dublin City Council v Fennell [2005] 1 IR 604 at 608: “The 2003 Act… does not 
purport to incorporate the Convention directly into domestic law, but rather imposes an obligation that, when 
interpreting or applying any statutory provision or rule of law, a court shall, insofar as is possible, and subject to 
the rules of law relating to such interpretation and application, do so in a manner compatible with the State's 
obligations under the Convention provisions. The 2003 Act also provides that every organ of the State shall, 
subject to any statutory provision or rule of law, perform its functions in a manner compatible with the State's 
obligations under the Convention provisions. A party may also seek from the High or Supreme Court a 
declaration that a statutory provision or rule of law is incompatible with the State's obligations under the 
Convention provisions, and where such a declaration is made certain consequences as detailed in the Act then 
follow.”
48
 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 4.
49
 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 2.
50
 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 5.
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In de Wilde and others v Belgium,51 the ECtHR observed that the purpose of this provision is 
to ensure that an individual has the right to have the lawfulness of his or her detention tested 
by a court: in that case review by a magistrate, acting in an administrative capacity, lacked 
the necessary judicial character. The Court further explained matters in Herczegfalvy v 
Austria:52
“According to the Court’s case-law on the scope of Article 5(1) and (4) of the 
Convention, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Convention such a review must 
comply with both the substantive and procedural rules of the national legislation and 
moreover be conducted in conformity with the aim of Article 5, namely to protect the 
individual against arbitrariness. The latter condition implies not only that the competent 
courts must decide ‘speedily’…but also that their decisions must follow at reasonable 
intervals.”  
Article 6(1) ECHR inter alia stipulates that:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
This provision guarantees the right to a fair trial, which includes the sentencing process. In 
Eckle v Germany,53 the ECtHR explained that:
“As regards the end of the ‘time’, in criminal matters the period governed by Article 
6(1) covers the whole of the proceedings in issue, including appeal proceedings….”54
The Court went on to state that:
“In the event of conviction, there is no ‘determination . . . of any criminal charge’, 
within the meaning of Article 6(1), as long as the sentence is not definitively fixed.”55
In V v United Kingdom,56 the ECtHR held that the fixing of the tariff is part of the sentencing 
process and must be undertaken by a court. Accordingly the fixing of the tariff by the Home 
Secretary for juveniles convicted of murder infringed Article 6(1) as the Home Secretary, 
who is an emanation of the executive, was not ‘an independent and impartial tribunal.’ In this 
respect the ECtHR in effect departed from its earlier decisions which accepted the propriety 
of the Home Secretary’s fixing the tariff in murder cases.57 Subsequently, in Stafford v 
United Kingdom,58 the Court ruled that the setting of the tariff should be the same for all life 
prisoners and should be undertaken by courts, not by the executive.
Article 7(1) prohibits retrospective criminalisation and punishment in the following terms:
51
 (1979) 1 EHRR 373.
52
 (1993) 15 EHRR 437 at para.75 (internal reference omitted).
53
 (1983) 5 EHRR 1.
54
 (1983) 5 E.HRR 1 at para.76.
55
 (1983) 5 EHRR 1 at para.77.
56
 (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 121.
57 Wynne v United Kingdom (1995) 19 EHRR 333; Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v. United Kingdom (1991) 13 
EHRR 666.
58
 (2002) 35 EHRR 32.
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“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the 
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that 
was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.”
Article 3 ECHR which stipulates that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment” might also be relevant. In general, sentencing matters are 
considered to fall outside the scope of the ECHR but the ECtHR has indicated that an 
arbitrary or disproportionately lengthy sentence might attract Convention censure.59 In V v 
United Kingdom,60 the Court opined that an unjustified and persistent failure to set a tariff, 
which leaves the detainee in a state of uncertainty over many years, might amount to a breach 
of Article 3.
2. Review of Life Sentences: the Case Law.
The ECtHR has been presented with a growing number of cases concerning the determination 
of life sentences in recent years. This has provided the Court with the opportunity to spell out 
in some detail the requirements of the ECHR on the matter. Accordingly it is incumbent on 
signatory states to align their procedures governing the conditional release on licence of life 
sentence prisoners with rulings of the Strasbourg Court.
In general, European human rights law accepts that the detention of a prisoner following his 
or her being sentenced by a court of competent jurisdiction is lawful. However, the ECtHR 
has acknowledged that in some circumstances a prisoner may invoke the provisions of Article 
5 to review his or her sentence.61 In the context of the review of life sentences the Court has 
clearly established that the fact that a person has been convicted does not preclude future 
review of his or her continued incarceration: in this regard the prisoner may invoke the 
review provisions of Article 5(4). 
Two key themes can be disinterred from the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. First, the underlying 
purpose of Article 5 is to protect individuals from being deprived of their liberty arbitrarily: 
in the context of life sentences prisoners a decision to continue their detention should not be 
taken arbitrarily. The required protection is achieved through the review mechanism 
prescribed by Article 5(4). Second, it may be inferred from the jurisprudence that prolonged 
detention can be justified on the limited grounds of risk and dangerousness. The second 
theme reflects the English tariff system62 under which a life sentence is in effect divided into 
punitive and preventative components. The thrust of the case law is to the effect that once the 
punitive element of the life sentence (as reflected in the tariff) has been served the continued 
detention of the prisoner can only be justified on the basis that he or she represents a 
continuing danger to the public, a matter that must be open to periodic review. Moreover, 
there must be a causal connection between the offence for which the prisoner has been 
convicted and the potential for re-offending.63 Although it has not been required to rule on 
the matter directly, it is significant that the Court has indicated that public acceptability is not 
a relevant criterion on which to base a decision relating to a prisoner’s release.64
59 Sawoniuk v United Kingdom 63716/00 ECHR (29 May 2001).
60
 (2000) 30 EHRR 121.
61
 See e.g. Iribarne Perez v France (1996) 22 EHRR 153.
62
 Outlined above in text at fnn 35-45.
63
van Droogenbroeck v Belgium (1982) 4 EHRR 443.
64 Stafford v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 32 at para. 80.
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The principle that the lawfulness of a life sentence prisoner’s continued detention must be 
periodically reviewed once the punitive element of the sentence has been served and the 
corresponding entitlement to challenge that detention in accordance with Article 5(4) was 
established in the late 1980s. In Weeks v United Kingdom65 the applicant, who had been 
convicted of robbery, received a discretionary life imprisonment on the grounds that he was a 
dangerous offender. He was subsequently released on licence but the licence was revoked 
when he committed a further offence. The court accepted that the freedom of a prisoner 
released on licence was “more precarious” than that of a normal citizen. However, the 
restrictions on the applicant as an “on licence” prisoner did not mean that he was not at 
liberty within the meaning of Article 5. Accordingly, he was entitled to invoke that provision. 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the decision to re-detain the applicant in this case was 
neither arbitrary nor unreasonable since it was based on his unstable and aggressive 
behaviour and it followed that there was no violation of Article 5(1). However, the Court 
went on to hold that once he was returned to custody the applicant was entitled to the review 
specified in Article 5(4) and in the circumstances it concluded that the procedures in the 
instant case were deficient.66
European human rights law governing the determination of life sentences has evolved over 
the past decade or so. At first the ECtHR drew a distinction between discretionary life 
sentences and mandatory life sentences, which coincided with the theory underpinning 
English law that the latter were exclusively punitive whereas the former incorporated a 
preventative element.67 Hence in Wynne v United Kingdom68 the court held that a periodic 
review of a mandatory life sentence was not required: in these circumstances the review 
requirements of Article 5(4) were sufficiently complied with by both the trial court and 
appellate courts. The facts of this case merit consideration. The applicant, who had been 
convicted of murder and sentenced to a mandatory life sentence, was released on licence. 
Some time later he killed a woman. Ultimately, he pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the 
grounds of diminished responsibility and received a discretionary life sentence. His licence 
was also revoked so he continued to serve the life sentence for murder. Arguing that he was 
in reality serving the discretionary life sentence, the applicant contended that he was entitled 
to have that sentence reviewed. The court dismissed that claim concluding that his conviction 
for manslaughter did not alter the validity of his original sentence for murder or the 
revocation of his licence. He continued to serve the mandatory life sentence and the 
discretionary life sentence for manslaughter merely added a supplemental basis for his 
detention. The court reasoned that a review of the manslaughter sentence would be “devoid 
of purpose”69 since the applicant would continue to be held under the mandatory life 
sentence. 
In Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v United Kingdom,70 the applicants, convicted sex offenders, 
were serving discretionary life sentences but their continued post-tariff detention had not 
been periodically reviewed. They claimed that this state of affairs violated Article 5(4) ECHR 
due to the absence of a review procedure to determine the lawfulness of the continued 
detention of the prisoners after the tariff period of the sentence had been served. This was not 
a challenge to the lawfulness of the imposition of the original sentence but rather against their 
65
 (1988) 10 EHRR 293.
66
 See further in text at fn 95.
67
 Discussed above in text at fnn 39-45.
68
 (1995) 19 EHRR 333.
69
 (1995) 19 EHRR 333 at paras. 37-38.
70
 (1991) 13 EHRR 666.
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continued indeterminate post-tariff detention. The ECtHR held that since the circumstances
that gave rise to the applicants’ initial detention may have since changed they were entitled to 
periodic reviews of their continued indeterminate detention after the punitive element of their 
respective life sentences had been served. The ECtHR explained that:71
“…the factors of mental instability and dangerousness are susceptible to change over 
the passage of time and new issues of lawfulness may thus arise in the course of 
detention. It follows that at that phase in the execution of their sentences, the applicants 
were entitled under Article 5 para.4 (art. 5-4) to take proceedings to have the lawfulness 
of their continued detention decided by a court at reasonable intervals and to have the 
lawfulness of any re-detention determined by a court.”
The ECtHR eventually came to realise that the distinction between mandatory and 
discretionary life sentences lacked substance. The initial change in tack occurred in several 
cases dealing juvenile offenders who had been convicted of murder. The mandatory sentence 
for such offenders was detention during Her Majesty’s Pleasure – in effect, they were 
sentenced to indefinite detention with their release being determined by the Home Secretary. 
In Hussain v United Kingdom,72 the applicant prisoner had been detained during Her 
Majesty’s Pleasure for a murder he committed when he was a juvenile. The ECtHR held that 
under Article 5(4) ECHR prisoners detained during Her Majesty’s Pleasure were entitled to 
have the lawfulness of their continued indeterminate detention considered by a court or quasi-
judicial body. Subsequently, in V and T v United Kingdom,73 the ECtHR effectively removed 
the Home Secretary’s power to decide on the release date and, therefore, to set the tariff 
period of those detained at Her Majesty’s pleasure. The ECtHR held that an “independent and 
impartial tribunal”, not the Home Secretary (an emanation of the executive), should set the 
tariff for juveniles convicted of murder. The setting of the tariff by the Home Secretary 
amounted to an infringement of the right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) ECHR.
Eventually, in Stafford v United Kingdom,74 a uniform regime was adopted for mandatory 
and discretionary life sentences and for juvenile murderers. The applicant was a convicted 
murderer whose tariff period had been set by the Home Secretary in accordance with English 
domestic practice at the time. He had been released on licence but that was revoked on his 
later conviction for fraud. On completion of his fraud sentence the Parole Board 
recommended that the applicant be released but the Home Secretary rejected that advice on 
the grounds that there was a risk that the applicant would engage in further fraud offences. 
The ECtHR ruled that the applicant’s rights under the provisions of Article 5(1) and (4) 
ECHR had been violated in that the setting of the tariff was a sentencing exercise for judges, 
not members of the executive. The ECtHR also held that the Home Secretary’s power of veto 
over a recommendation by the Parole Board to release a post-tariff life prisoner contravened 
Articles 5(1) and 5(4) ECHR. 
In Stafford, the ECtHR was particularly influenced by the fact that at this stage it had become 
widely accepted that the view that a mandatory life sentence amounts to punishment for life 
71
 (1991) 13 EHRR 666, at para. 76.
72
 (1996) 22 EHRR 1.
73
 (2000) 30 EHRR 121.
74
 (2002) 35 EHRR 32.
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no longer corresponds with practical reality.75 The UK government had sought to maintain 
the distinction between mandatory and discretionary life sentences by arguing that, unlike the 
latter, the former was not based on individual characteristics of dangerousness: accordingly, 
the argument ran, there was no issue of changing circumstances that might undermine the 
basis for continued detention. The Court rejected that argument, concluding that mandatory 
life sentences contain a punitive element that is reflected in the tariff. Once that period had 
been served, the Court reasoned, the grounds for continued incarceration, “as in discretionary 
life and juvenile murder cases must be considerations of risk and dangerousness.”76 Since 
those elements are liable to change over time, as in the case of other life sentence prisoners, 
the continued lawfulness of a prisoner’s detention cannot be assumed. Departing from its 
judgment in Wynne v United Kingdom the ECtHR concluded that “it can no longer be 
maintained that the original trial and appeal proceedings satisfied, once and for all, issues of 
compatibility of subsequent detention of mandatory life prisoners with the provisions of Art 
5(1) of the Convention.”77
Following the decision in Stafford it is settled that, irrespective of the form the indeterminate 
life sentence takes, once the punitive element of the sentence has expired Article 5(4) 
demands that a prisoner may have lawfulness of his continued indeterminate detention 
reviewed by a “court.”78 The concept of lawfulness embraces both domestic and Convention 
law: it requires the detention to conform with domestic substantive and procedural rules and 
to be “in keeping with the purposes of Art 5, namely to protect the individual from 
arbitrariness.”79 In the context of life sentences continued detention after the expiry of the 
punitive element has been served is justifiable only on grounds of risk and dangerousness. 
Factors that the Court has indicated that are relevant in assessing whether the continued 
detention is lawful include mental instability,80 unstable, disturbed and aggressive 
behaviour,81 youth and level of maturity82 and personality factors such as anger, alcoholism 
and ability to maintain relationships.83 Given that these factors are liable to change over time 
a life sentence prisoner is entitled to frequent review of his or her sentence.84
It is also clear that the notion of lawful imprisonment insists that there is a sufficient 
connection between the prisoner’s continued detention and the offence for which he or she 
was convicted. Thus, in Stafford v United Kingdom,85 the Court condemned the imprisonment 
of a convicted murderer where his continued detention was based on a fear that he would 
commit fraud offences in the future. On the other hand, the circumstances of the original 
offence might be relevant to the issue of connection: in Waite v United Kingdom,86 the Court 
held that there was a sufficient connection where the accused, who killed his grandmother 
75
 In both Scotland and Northern Ireland the law had been altered to assign the function of setting the tariff to 
the trial judge: Convention Rights (Compliance) (Scotland) Act 2001; the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) 
Order 2001, S.I. No. 2564 of 2001.
76 (2002) 35 EHRR 32 at para. 80.
77 (2002) 35 EHRR 32 at para. 87. 
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79 Stafford v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 32 at para. 63.
80 Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 666; Stafford v United Kingdom (2002) 35 
EHRR 32. 
81 Weeks v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 293.
82 Waite v United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 53236/99.
83 Oldham v United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 36273/97.
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while addicted to glue-sniffing has his licence revoked following his arrest for possession of 
drugs.
3. Frequency of Review.
While Article 5(4) requires a speedy decision it allows a measure of procedural flexibility. 
The ECtHR has acknowledged that the review period may vary according to the individual 
circumstances of the prisoner. In Oldham v United Kingdom,87 the ECtHR held that an 
interval of two years between assessments did not fulfil the requirements of Article 5(4). The 
applicant attended a number of prescribed courses that were designed to deal with his 
problems of anger, alcoholism and relationships. He completed these courses within eight 
months of his earlier review and a further 16 months passed before the next review. The UK 
government contended that the delay was necessary to monitor the applicant’s progress but 
did not explain the nature or duration of that process. The Court concluded that: 88
“…in the circumstances of this case that the two year delay between reviews was not 
reasonable and that the question of whether his continued detention was lawful was not 
decided ‘speedily’ within the meaning of Article 5(4) of the Convention.  There has, 
accordingly, been a violation of this provision.”
The ECtHR also considered the issue of frequency in Blackstock v United Kingdom,89 which 
involved a gap of 22 months between reviews. The applicant received a discretionary life 
sentence for wounding a police officer. On the expiry of his minimum term (i.e. tariff) his 
detention was reviewed by the Parole Board who in June 1998 recommended that he be 
transferred to an open prison or, if that recommendation was not accepted by the Home 
Secretary, a further review in 12 months.90 The Home Secretary rejected the recommendation 
and in September 1998 ruled that the applicant be transferred to a Category C prison.91 The 
appropriate transfer instructions were issued the following month but the applicant objected 
to the proposed prison to which he was to be sent, indicating his preference to be sent to one 
of several other named prisons. In December 1998 it was decided to transfer him to one of 
those prisons but that did not happen until April 1999 when a place became available. His 
next review took place in April 2000 with the Parole Board again recommending his transfer 
to open conditions. The Home Secretary accepted the latter recommendation.
87
 [2000] ECHR 36273/97.
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18
In ruling in favour of the applicant, the Court’s starting point was that the frequency of 
reviews required by Article 5(4) ECHR must be determined in the light of the circumstances 
of each case and it refused to lay down a firm rule stipulating a maximum period between 
reviews. Instead, the Court recognised that a flexible approach is to be preferred since the 
personal circumstances of prisoners will differ markedly. Thus the Court had ruled in some 
earlier cases that gaps of between 15 months and two years were unreasonable92 while 
accepting a two-year lapse in another case.93 In the instant case the UK government had 
sought to justify the delay on a combination of the delay (almost six months) in finding a 
place in the prison nominated by the applicant and a desire that he should spend 12 months in 
that facility before being considered for transfer to open conditions. The Court was not 
persuaded by that argument: no formal courses had been prescribed for the applicant when he 
was transferred and there was no evidence that, in the light of the administrative delays, 
consideration had been given to whether it was necessary to insist on the usual 12 months in 
Category C before reviewing his case.
4. What Constitutes a ‘Court’?
The ECtHR has reflected on what constitutes a “court” for the purposes of Article 5(4). In 
Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v United Kingdom,94 the ECtHR ruled that a “court-like body” 
should determine the release date of life sentence prisoners. For these purposes a “court” does 
not per se have to be a permanent court in the legal system of a signatory state. In Weeks v 
United Kingdom, the ECtHR explained that:95
“The ‘court’ referred to in Article 5 para.4 (art. 5-4) does not necessarily have to be a 
court of law of the classic kind integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the 
country….The term ‘court’ serves to denote ‘bodies which exhibit not only common 
fundamental features, of which the most important is independence of the executive and 
of the parties to the case...but also the guarantees’ – ‘appropriate to the kind of 
deprivation of liberty in question’ – ‘of a judicial procedure’, the forms of which may 
vary from one domain to another….In addition, as the text of Article 5 para.4 (art. 5-4) 
makes clear, the body in question must not have merely advisory functions but must 
have the competence to ‘decide the ‘lawfulness’ of the detention and to order release if 
the detention is unlawful. There is thus nothing to preclude a specialised body such as 
the Parole Board being considered as a ‘court’ within the meaning of Article 5 para.4 
(art. 5-4), provided it fulfils the foregoing conditions….” 
Thus, a quasi-judicial body, such as a parole board, is a “court” within the meaning of Article 
5(4) ECHR provided that its deliberations are determinative rather than advisory. It is also 
clear that the body charged with deciding on whether the life prisoner should be released 
must be independent of executive and of the parties involved.
In Neumeister v Austria, the ECtHR addressed the issue of independence of the Court from 
the procedures adopted in the following terms:96
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“Nor is it possible to justify application of the principle of ‘equality of arms’ to 
proceedings against detention on remand by invoking Article 5(4) which, while 
requiring that such proceedings shall be allowed, stipulates that they should be taken 
before a ‘court’. This term implies only that the authority called upon to decide thereon 
must possess a judicial character, that is to say, be independent both of the executive 
and of the parties to the case; it in no way relates to the procedure to be followed.” 
The central principle set out in Neumeister was amplified in de Wilde and others v Belgium,97
where the ECtHR insisted that the procedures adopted must be judicial in nature and must 
provide “the individual concerned [with] guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of 
liberty in question.”98
The decision in Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom,99 which concerned a prison 
disciplinary hearing conducted by the Board of Visitors, is instructive. The Court outlined the 
general approach:100
“In determining whether a body can be considered to be ‘independent’ - notably of the 
executive and of the parties to the case … the Court has had regard to the manner of 
appointment of its members and the duration of their term of office … the existence of 
guarantees against outside pressures … and the question whether the body presents an 
appearance of independence ….”
The applicants challenged the authority of the Board on a number of grounds: (i) that the fact 
that members were appointed by the Home Secretary deprived the Board of the independence 
required of a quasi-judicial body; (ii) that the issuing by Home Office of guidelines to the 
Board “in the performance of their functions” compromised its independence: (iii) that the 
term of office served by Board members (three years or such lesser period stipulated by the 
Home Secretary) was problematic; and (iv) that the fact that there was no stipulation 
governing the removal of Board members or a guarantee against their being removed 
undermined their independence.
The Court rejected each of the foregoing arguments. As to the first, the Court stated that the 
fact of appointment by the Home Secretary does not in itself compromise the independence 
of the Board: the Court equated the position of Board members with that of judges who are 
nominated to office by the executive. The central point was whether members of the Board 
were protected against external pressures. In this regard the Court, addressing the second 
point canvassed by the applicants, found that the Home Office guidelines did not amount to 
instructions as to how the Board would adjudicate their judicial function. 
As to the “admittedly relatively short” term of office the Court accepted that there were 
considerable reasons for the short period of appointment: members were not remunerated and 
it was difficult to find willing individuals to serve on the Board for longer periods. On the 
question of removal of Board members the Court noted that a guarantee against being 
removed is generally a key feature of judges’ independence; however, the Court took the 
97
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view that the lack of a formal guarantee against removal did not in itself deny the 
independence of the Board.
A final concern raised in Campbell and Fell related to the dual role of the Board, which acts 
in both adjudicatory and supervisory capacities. In its supervisory guise the Board provided 
independent oversight of the administration of the prison, a function which of its nature 
would include frequent contact with prison officials. When acting in an adjudicative capacity 
the Board would be required to determine, inter alia, disciplinary complaints brought against 
prisoners by the same prison officials. In short, it was contended that the Board’s close 
association with the prison administration compromised its independence when it came to 
resolving disputes in that same institution. The ECtHR acknowledged the importance of 
justice being seen to be done but concluded that the fact that prisoners believed the Board to 
be partial did not in itself establish a lack of independence on its part. The court observed that 
it would reach a different conclusion “if prisoners were reasonably entitled, on account of the 
frequent contacts between a Board and the authorities, to think that the former was dependent 
on the latter.”
5. Procedures and the Scope of Review.
It is essential that the body reviewing a prisoner’s detention adopts procedures that are 
judicial in nature. In E v Norway, the ECtHR outlined the general position under this 
provision in the following terms:101
“Article 5(4) does not guarantee a right to judicial review of such a scope as to 
empower the court on all aspects of the case, including questions of pure expediency, to
substitute its own discretion for that of the decision-making authority. The review 
should, however, be wide enough to bear on those conditions which are essential for the 
‘lawful’ detention of a person according to Article 5(1).”
Nevertheless, the ECtHR has held that domestic judicial review proceedings do not satisfy 
Article 5(4) ECHR on the ground that that procedure is not sufficiently wide to determine 
whether the prisoner’s continued imprisonment was justified by the objectives of the 
indeterminate sentence.102 The Court has also taken the opportunity to provide some 
procedural detail. It has held that the review proceedings must be adversarial103 with the 
prisoner being afforded an opportunity to attend an oral hearing the respects the rights to be 
legally represented and to call and question witnesses.104 The Court has also ruled that a 
failure to disclose adverse material that the review body had in its possession did not satisfy 
the requirements of Article 5(4) ECHR.
6. The ECHR Position Summarised.
The cardinal principles of ECHR law relating to the determination of life sentences can be 
summarised thus:
• a life sentence is not per se a breach of Convention rights;
101
 (1994) 17 EHRR 30 at para.50.
102 Weeks v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 293; see also Singh v United Kingdom [1996] EHRC 23389/94.
103 Hussein v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 1; Singh v United Kingdom [1996] EHRC 23389/94.
104 Hussein v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 1; Singh v United Kingdom [1996] EHRC 23389/94; Stafford v 
United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 46295/99; Waite v United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 53236/99.
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• once the punitive element of the sentence has been served a life sentence prisoner is 
entitled to a speedy and frequent review by a court or quasi-judicial body of the 
lawfulness of his continued detention;
• whether a review is sufficiently speedy or frequent is to be determined in the light of 
the circumstances of the particular case;
• the concept of “lawfulness” embraces both domestic law and ECHR considerations; 
the permitted grounds for continued detention are risk and dangerousness; the review 
must be sufficiently broad to allow a determination as to whether the grounds for 
continued detention still operate; and
• the body reviewing the detention must be invested with the power to determine the 
lawfulness of the prisoner’s detention rather than acting in a merely advisory 
capacity; the body must be independent of the executive and of the parties and must 
adopt appropriate procedures in its hearings.
III. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
International Human Rights standards aim to ensure government accountability for alleged 
violations of fundamental human rights. They include declarations, treaties, protocols, and 
other international human rights instruments, thus providing a global legal framework for the 
protection of human rights. While not binding in the domestic law, they may nevertheless 
offer persuasive authority in the adjudication of the determination of life sentences as this 
issue arises before national courts.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
This United Nations Treaty105 and its first Optional Protocol106 allow individuals to submit 
complaints under the provisions of the Covenant to the Human Rights Committee. The 
Committee monitors the implementation of the ICCPR and protocols thereto by signatory 
states. Article 2 of the first Optional Protocol inter alia provides that:
“…individuals who claim that any of their rights enumerated in the Covenant have been 
violated and who have exhausted all available domestic remedies may submit a written 
communication to the Committee for consideration.” 
Article 40.1 of the ICCPR requires:
“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures 
they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress 
made in the enjoyment of those rights.”
105
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was signed by Ireland on 1 October 1973 and 
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The Committee, however, is not a judicial body and does not make binding judgments 
analogous to those issued by a court of law.107 Nevertheless, with regard to the determination 
of life sentences, the following provisions of the ICCPR may be influential before the 
national courts of state parties to the Covenant.
Article 9 (1) provides:
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such 
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.”
Thus, an individual may be lawfully detained as long as this detention is in accordance with 
domestic law and is not deemed arbitrary. However, the continued indeterminate detention of 
prisoners beyond the punitive element of the sentence would constitute a violation of this 
provision. 
Article 9 (4) requires a mechanism of review of detention by a court:
“Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.”
In Weismann and Perdomo v Uruguay,108 the Human Rights Committee found that the 
applicants’ continued detention violated both Article 9(1) because they were not released for 
five and ten months respectively, and Article 9(4) because the applicants were unable to 
mount an effective challenge to their arrest and detention.
While the determinations of the Human Rights Committee are not binding, an extract from 
General Comment 8 clearly recognises that preventative detention may be justified in the 
appropriate circumstances where public safety is an issue of concern in the sentencing of a 
dangerous offender: 109
“…if so-called preventive detention is used, for reasons of public security, it must be 
controlled by these same provisions, i.e. it must not be arbitrary, and must be based on 
grounds and procedures established by law (para.1), information of the reasons must be 
given (para.2) and court control of the detention must be available (para.4) as well as 
compensation in the case of a breach (para.5)…”
Accordingly, once proper procedures are in place for periodic reviews of the continued 
indeterminate detention of prisoners sentenced under the provisions dangerous offender 
legislation, as may be enacted by state parties, such continued indeterminate detention may 
be justified in the appropriate circumstances.
107
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Article 15(1) inter alia provides:
“Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time 
when the criminal offence was committed.”
This provision was considered in ARS v Canada,110 where the Human Rights Committee 
determined as follows:
“The Committee notes also that mandatory supervision cannot be considered as 
equivalent to a penalty, but is rather  a  measure  of  social  assistance  intended  to  
provide  for  the rehabilitation of the convicted person, in his own interest. The fact 
that, even in the event of remission of the sentence being earned, the person concerned 
remains subject to supervision after his release and does not regain his  unconditional  
freedom,  cannot  therefore  be characterized  as  the  imposition  or  re-imposition  of  a  
penalty  incompatible  with  the guarantees laid down in article 15 (1) of the Covenant.”
It follows that the imposition of conditions on a prisoner who is allowed parole will not 
trigger Article 15(1) since those conditions do not amount “to a heavier penalty …than the 
one that applicable at the time the offence was committed.”
IV. CURRENT IRISH LAW
The ECtHR jurisprudence on the review of life sentences has been sculpted against the 
background of English sentencing law and practice. Because of this it is important to 
appreciate the difference between the structure of life sentences in England and Ireland.111 In 
contrast to the position in England, Irish sentencing law and practice has been largely shaped 
by judicial decisions and there is a comparative paucity of legislation regulating sentencing 
policy and processes. Irish law has conventionally avoided the use of sentencing tariffs, i.e.
specifying the minimum period of imprisonment to be served by the prisoner reflecting the 
punitive element of the sentence, with the remainder of the sentence being regarded as 
serving the purpose of public protection. Exceptions to Irish law’s stance against tariffs are 
the statutorily mandated minimum periods of 40 years’ imprisonment for the treason and 
certain forms of murder112 and ten years for possession of drugs contrary to section 15A of 
110
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the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977.113 Furthermore, Irish courts have consistently emphasised 
proportionality as the governing principle in sentencing matters, thus inviting the conclusion 
that in Irish law sentences, and ergo life sentences, are purely punitive with no element of 
preventative detention being incorporated.
The focus of European human rights jurisprudence is on continued imprisonment after the 
punitive period has been served. A prisoner’s further detention is justifiable only on grounds 
relating to public protection and the circumstances leading to that detention are liable to 
change over time: hence the need for speedy and frequent reviews.114 It might be inferred 
from this that since Irish life sentences do not explicitly contain a preventative element they 
are unaffected by existing ECtHR jurisprudence. Moreover, that court at first accepted that 
mandatory life sentences were different in kind to discretionary ones and it initially held that 
review of former was satisfied by the trial and appeal: in other words, once the legal process 
had terminated a mandatory life prisoner had no further right of review under Article 5(4) 
ECHR.115 However, the Court reversed that ruling in Stafford v United Kingdom,116 when it 
was persuaded that any distinction between the two forms of life sentence had evaporated.117
In this, the Court was influenced by changes in English sentencing practice and by 
pronouncements by various Home Secretaries outlining their approach to mandatory life 
sentences.118
It is contended that the same conclusion must be drawn in relation to life sentences in Ireland. 
While such sentences may be purely punitive in theory, in practice matters are different. Life 
sentence prisoners in Ireland do not necessarily remain in prison for the remainder of their 
natural life but may be conditionally released following the completion of a significant term 
of the sentence (usually a minimum of 12-14 years).119 Lord Mustill’s observations, quoted 
above,120 on the usual and intended effect that a life sentence apply with equal force in the 
Irish context. 
The statutory authority to grant release is invested in the Minister for Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform who is advised by the Parole Board,121 a non-statutory body. It would appear 
that the Minister accepts the recommendations of the Parole Board in the vast majority of 
cases. Thus, in 2005 the Minister accepted 80 percent of the Board’s recommendations in full 
(37 cases) and a further 4 percent (2 cases) in part: just 2 percent of recommendations 
(amounting to one case) were rejected.122
While the executive has the authority to decide on the conditional release of life sentence 
prisoners, the absence of an adequate supervisory role by a court or “court-like” body over 
this process conflicts with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
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1. Sentencing Policy.
The principle of proportionality dominates Irish sentencing policy.123 It stipulates that the 
actual sentence imposed should be proportionate not only to the gravity of the offence 
committed but also to the personal circumstances of the particular offender.124  There is little 
scope for taking account of the probability that the defendant will re-offend at some future 
unspecified sate or that he or she presents a continuing a danger to the public.125 Thus, in The
People (DPP) v WC Flood J stated:126
“In my view the selection of the particular punishment to be imposed on an individual 
offender is subject to the constitutional principle of proportionality. By this I mean that 
the imposition of a particular sentence must strike a balance between the particular 
circumstances of the commission of the relevant offence and the relevant personal 
circumstances of the person sentenced. It is not open to a judge in a criminal case when 
imposing sentence, whether for a particular type of offence, or in respect of a particular 
class of offender, to fetter the exercise of his judicial discretion through the operation of 
a fixed policy, or to otherwise pre-determine that issue.”
The dominance of the proportionality principle in the Irish sentencing process would appear 
to preclude the imposition of preventative sentences along the lines practised in the United 
Kingdom.127 Indeed, several recent decisions of the Irish courts have ruled against the 
imposition of discretionary life sentences as a form of preventative detention.128 In DPP v 
Jackson,129 Carney J had imposed a discretionary life sentence on the defendant, a serious sex 
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offender but the Court of Criminal Appeal subsequently overturned that sentence on the basis 
that it constituted one of preventative detention. The Court clearly rejected the notion that 
preventative detention is a feature of Irish sentencing law, stating that:130
“The Court is satisfied that preventative detention is not known to our judicial system 
and that there is no form of imprisonment for preventative detention”.
The decision in Jackson was applied in The People (DPP) v Bambrick,131 where the Central 
Criminal Court refused to impose a sentence of preventative detention. Carney J explained 
that he was:
“…precluded from approaching the case on the basis that over and above any 
considerations of punishment this dangerous accused should be preventively detained 
until in the opinion of the most qualified experts he is safe to be let back into the 
community”.132
In view of this general policy, the sentencing process should not be concerned with the 
potential for future re-offending at an unspecified date.133
The judicial resistance to sentencing on a preventative basis matches the approach that the 
courts had adopted to the granting of bail, which they ruled could not be refused on the 
grounds that it was feared that the accused would commit further offences if released. The 
rationale was stated in clear terms in The People (Attorney General) v O’Callaghan.134
Refusal of bail on those grounds would be:135
“…a form of preventative justice which has no place in our legal system… it would be 
quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any 
person should be punished in respect of any matter upon which he has not been 
convicted or that in any circumstances he should be deprived of his liberty upon only 
the belief that he will commit further offences if left at liberty …”
As it happens, the position in relation to bail was altered by the Sixteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution and by the Bail Act 1997, thus reversing the immediate impact of the earlier 
decisions on bail. Nevertheless, for present purposes that body of jurisprudence remains 
relevant in that it might be invoked in support of a broader underlying principle concerning 
the constitutionality of preventative detention.136 The question is whether the case law points 
to a general constitutional prohibition on preventative detention, which extends inter alia to 
sentencing matters.
The decision in O’Callaghan was subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court in Ryan v 
DPP,137 but it is unclear whether the opposition to preventative detention is constitutionally 
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mandated. It is true that part of the judgment in O’Callaghan spoke of preventative detention 
in the context of the right to personal liberty, which would invite the conclusion that the 
prohibition on preventative detention is constitutional in nature. If this is the proper 
interpretation it would have far-reaching consequences: it would preclude the Oireachtas 
from enacting legislation that authorises preventative detention, at least in the sphere of 
criminal justice,138 and would present a compelling case impeding the courts from re-
considering their views on sentencing on preventative grounds. 
On the other hand, the courts have not firmly ruled that there is a constitutional bar to 
preventative detention: the language in their judgments is more oblique. Moreover, in 
O’Callaghan Walsh J alluded to the possibility that in the “most extraordinary circumstances 
carefully spelled out”139 legislation authorising preventative detention would be permitted. 
However, the examples he provided of such circumstances were “the preservation of public 
peace and order or the public safety and preservation of the State in a time of national 
emergency or in some such situation akin to that”:140 it is a matter of speculation whether 
sentencing on preventative grounds would be included. 
A related issue is whether the principle of proportionality is constitutionally embedded. If it is 
mandatory sentencing, and especially the mandatory life sentence for murder, would be open 
to constitutional challenge. Moreover, a constitutional rule mandating proportionate 
sentencing would prohibit the enactment of legislation that sought to incorporate other 
features, in particular rehabilitation and incapacitation, into sentencing practice. The status of 
the principle of proportionality awaits judicial clarification141 and all that safely be said at this 
stage is that current Irish sentencing is based on firm punitive grounds and eschews public 
protection as a legitimate ground on which to base a sentence of imprisonment. For the 
reasons alluded to earlier142 this state of affairs should not preclude the application of 
European human rights jurisprudence to the issue of reviewing life sentences.
2. The Constitutional and Legislative Framework.
The pardoning of offenders and the commutation and remission of punishment is governed 
by Article 13.6, which provides that:
“The right of pardon and the power to commute or remit punishment imposed by any 
court exercising criminal jurisdiction are hereby vested in the President, but such 
power of commutation or remission may also be conferred by law on other 
authorities.”
The Criminal Procedure Act 1993 prescribes the procedure to be followed by a person who 
seeks a presidential pardon. The power of pardon cannot be delegated but it is clear that the 
powers of commutation and remission are delegable. Section 23(1) of the Criminal Justice 
138
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Act 1951, duly conferred the “power to commute or remit punishment” on the executive.143
Section 23A of the 1951 Act, inserted by section 17 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1997, allows the government to delegate its powers of remission to the 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform.
The courts have considered the nature of the power of remission. In The State (O) v 
O’Brien,144 Ó Dálaigh CJ drew a distinction between an act of sentencing and one that “just” 
effects a remission.145 Walsh J, drawing the same distinction, spoke of the judicial character 
of the power of remission:146
“The power of commutation and remission … is a power which, although a power of a 
judicial character, is nonetheless expressly conferred by the provisions of the 
Constitution upon the President and, in certain instances, upon the Executive or 
members thereof. It was, of course, quite open to the People when enacting the 
Constitution to confer powers of a judicial character upon the Executive or to provide 
by the Constitution means whereby it could be done by Act of the Oireachtas: but that 
does not alter the nature of the power.”
In a dissenting judgment, McLoughlin J expressed a different view. He saw the power of 
commutation and remission as corresponding to the royal prerogative of mercy and, there, as 
being executive in nature. In Brennan v Minister for Justice,147 Geoghegan J also preferred 
the views that the power of remission is executive in nature. However, he went on to state 
that that power should be exercised sparingly and, given the special nature of the power, the 
evidence supporting a decision to remit and the reasons for it should be recorded. Moreover, 
he concluded that the exercise of the power of remission is open to judicial review.  
The constitutionally based powers of commutation and remission are complemented by the 
statutory power to order the temporary release of prisoners: in practice it is the latter power 
that is employed to effect the release of life sentence prisoners. A comprehensive statutory 
regime governing the temporary release was adopted in 2003 when section 2 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1960 was amended by section 1 of the Criminal Justice (Temporary Release of 
Prisoners) Act 2003:
“The Minister may direct that such person as is specified in the direction (being a 
person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment) shall be released from prison for 
such temporary period, and subject to such conditions, as may be specified in the 
direction or rules under this section…”
This provision establishes a clear legislative basis for the power of the Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform to grant temporary release of prisoners by setting down the 
principles that will apply to its exercise.148 The Act stipulates the purposes for which 
temporary release may be ordered: to assess the prisoner’s ability to be re-integrated into 
society, to prepare him or her for release on the expiry of his or her sentence or to assist the 
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Garda Síochána in investigating crime;149 where release is warranted on health or 
humanitarian grounds;150 on the grounds of good prison management;151 and where the 
Minister is of the opinion that the prisoner has been rehabilitated and is ready for re-
integration into society.152
Section 2(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1960 requires the Minister to take account of a range 
of factors in reaching a decision on temporary release:
“(a) the nature and gravity of the offence to which the sentence of imprisonment being 
served by the person relates.
(b) the sentence of imprisonment concerned and any recommendations of the court that 
imposed that sentence in relation thereto,
(c) the period of the sentence of imprisonment served by the person,
(d) the potential threat to the safety and security of members of the public (including 
the victim of the offence to which the sentence of imprisonment being served by the 
person relates) should the person be released from prison,
(e) any offence of which the person was convicted before being convicted of the 
offence to which the sentence of imprisonment being served by him relates,
(f) the risk of the person failing to return to prison upon the expiration of any period of 
temporary release,
(g) the conduct of the person while in custody, while previously the subject of a 
direction under this section, or during a period of temporary release to which rules 
under this section, made before the coming into operation of the Criminal Justice 
(Temporary Release of Prisoners) Act 2003, applied,
(h) any report of, or recommendation made by—
(i) the governor of, or person for the time being performing the functions of 
governor in relation to, the prison concerned,
(ii) the Garda Síochána,
(iii) a probation and welfare officer, or
(iv) any other person whom the Minister considers would be of assistance in 
enabling him to make a decision as to whether to give a direction under subsection 
(1) that relates to the person concerned.
(i) the risk of the person committing an offence during any S.1 period of temporary 
release,
(j) the risk of the person failing to comply with any conditions attaching to his 
temporary release, and
149
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(k) the likelihood that any period of temporary release might accelerate the person's 
reintegration into society or improve his prospects of obtaining employment.”
The Minister is prevented from ordering temporary release if he or she is of the opinion that it 
would not be appropriate to do so for reasons connected with any of the foregoing factors or 
if the prisoner has been remanded in custody by a court.153 Moreover, section 2(3)(b) 
stipulates that a prisoner may not be released if another statute prohibits such release, a 
provision that is relevant in the case of those serving sentences for treason, certain forms of 
murder and section 15A drugs offences.154
The power to order temporary release applies to life sentence prisoners and those serving a 
fixed term alike. It is noteworthy that both punitive and preventative considerations feature in 
the decision to allow temporary release. In particular, the factors listed in section 2(2)(a), (b) 
and (c) relate to the offender’s culpability while the provision in paragraph (d) is clearly 
preventative in nature. Therefore, despite the courts’ determination to avoid sentencing on a 
preventative basis the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform is statutorily obliged to 
take preventative considerations into account when deciding on the question of temporary 
release. As far as life sentence prisoners are concerned the net effect of this state of affairs is 
that the determination of their sentence is, in part, shaped by preventative concerns. To this 
extent, the fate of the life sentence prisoner in Ireland differs little from his or her English 
counterpart, despite the formal differences in sentence structure between the two 
jurisdictions.155
The power to grant temporary release has been distinguished from the power to commute or 
remit punishment. In Kinahan v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform the 
Supreme Court, per Hardiman J, stated: 156
“It does not appear … that temporary release is a specific exercise of the general power 
of commutation or remission envisaged in the Constitution. Rather, it appears to be a 
statutory creation administered under the Prisoners (Temporary Release) Rules, 1960, 
which instrument was in turn made under the powers conferred by the Criminal Justice 
Act, 1960.”
3. Judicial Consideration of Temporary Release.
The Irish courts have been consistent in their reluctance to engage in the review of sentences. 
Inspired by separation of powers considerations they have indicated that the question of early 
release is an executive matter and that the courts should exercise caution in encroaching on 
that territory. The executive enjoys a wide discretion in the matter of release, which is seen as 
a privilege that is extended to prisoners rather than a right.157 Judicial review of a refusal to 
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order temporary release would be successful only on the limited grounds that the refusal was 
arbitrary, capricious or unjust.158
In The People (DPP) v Tiernan it was held that a court should not take account of the 
possible release of an offender when determining the appropriate sentence to impose. Finlay 
CJ emphasised the discretionary nature of temporary release:159
“What is described in this ground as the conventional period a person who has been 
sentenced to life imprisonment might expect to serve is a matter of a policy pursued by 
the Executive at given times and subject to variation at the discretion of the Executive. 
It cannot, therefore, in my view, properly be taken into consideration by a court in 
imposing sentence.”
In Murray v Ireland,160 the Supreme Court refused to direct the executive to grant temporary 
release to the plaintiffs, a married couple serving life sentences for murder. Finlay CJ 
stated:161
“…it was said that a court should direct the executive to grant temporary release for this 
purpose….The length of time which a person sentenced to imprisonment for life spends 
in custody and as a necessary consequence the extent to which, if any, prior to final 
discharge, such a person obtains temporary release is a matter which under the 
constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers rests entirely with the executive…”
Finlay CJ continued:162
“The exercise of these powers of the executive is of course subject to supervision by the 
courts which will intervene only if it can be established that they are being exercised in 
a manner which is in breach of the constitutional obligation of the executive not to 
exercise them in a capricious, arbitrary or unjust way. It is not, however, in my view, 
permissible for the court to intervene merely on the grounds that it would…have 
reached a different conclusion on the appropriateness…of temporary release.”
The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated this view. In McHugh v Minister for Justice163
the Court stressed that temporary release and any form of release under escort are exclusively 
matters within the Minister’s discretion. In Kinahan v Minister for Justice and Law Reform164
the Court took the view that the same legal position governs the release of life sentence 
prisoners and those serving determinate sentences alike. Referring to the decision in Murray, 
Hardiman J stated:165
158
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“In my view, this decision properly emphasises the importance of the constitutional 
separation of powers in dealing with the implementation by the executive of a judicially 
imposed sentence of imprisonment. It also correctly identifies the sole circumstances in 
which the court would be justified in interfering with a decision in relation to temporary 
release.”
As to the exercise of the executive discretion in the matter the Court rejected the notion that 
there is a presumption that a prisoner is entitled to temporary release.166
The Criminal Justice (Release of Prisoners) Act 1998 was enacted in the aftermath to the 
“Good Friday Agreement” to provide a mechanism for the early release of prisoners. The 
Supreme Court, again emphasising the discretionary nature of the power to release, has held 
that the Act did not create a right to be released. In O’Neill v Governor of Castlerea Prison
Keane CJ spoke for the Court:167
“The power to release itself, whether exercised on what might be called conventional 
grounds of a compassionate or humanitarian nature or for purely political 
considerations, as in the case of releases effected for the purpose of giving effect to the 
Belfast Agreement, is a quintessentially executive function”
The broad nature of the discretion to grant temporary release was central to the decision of 
the High Court in Breathnach v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,168 where the 
applicant was granted temporary release on condition that he remained handcuffed during his 
release. He challenged that condition as being unreasonable and argued that since the 
respondent had not presented material to the court to show why handcuffing was necessary 
the court should conclude that there was no basis to support that condition. Rejecting the 
claim, Ó Caoimh J concluded that it was within the respondent’s discretion “to release the 
applicant subject to any conditions which he chose to impose.”169 The Court also took the 
view that in the circumstances it was not necessary to give reasons for the imposition of the 
condition.170
The revocation of temporary release where a prisoner had been charged with, but not 
convicted, of another offence was condemned by the Supreme Court in The State (Murphy) v 
Kielt.171 While the Court acknowledged the executive’s discretion in the matter it ruled that in 
the circumstances the applicant should have been afforded the opportunity to refute the 
allegation. Griffin J explained:172
“…the fact that the [applicant] had been charged with an offence is an insufficient 
reason for the revocation of his temporary release. Charges are frequently dropped or 
not proceeded with and, if temporary release can be revoked merely or solely because 
the person released has been charged with an offence, what of the apparent injustice 
166
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done to such a person who, in the period intervening between the charge and the 
dropping of the charges, has lost the liberty to which he would otherwise have been 
entitled…”
It would appear that one response to the decision in The State (Murphy) v Kielt was to allow 
shorter periods of temporary release which could be renewed each time the previous period 
expired. The strategy was considered in Dowling v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform.173 The applicant in the latter case was a life sentence prisoner who had been granted 
temporary release on a monthly renewable basis: he was required to sign on at Mountjoy 
Prison on the 23rd of each month. On 23 December 1999 the applicant was arrested and 
questioned by Gardaí in relation to a murder and, although he was released from Garda 
custody without charge, he was returned to prison the same day. The High Court refused to 
quash the revocation on the grounds that temporary release was a concession to which the 
prisoner had no right. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the revocation. 
The Court again emphasised that temporary release is a privilege and that the executive 
enjoys a wide discretion in the matter. Moreover, Murray J, echoing ECtHR pronouncements 
on the matter,174 commented on the conditional nature of the liberty of a prisoner on 
temporary release: it is not “on a par”175 with that of the ordinary citizen. 
The decision in Dowling turned on an interpretation of the nature of the release granted to the 
applicant. Was it, as the respondent contended, a series of separate one month releases with a 
new one-month period of release being allowed each time? If that was the position it was 
clear that the executive could not be compelled to grant a fresh period of temporary release 
on the expiry of any particular period of release. However, the Court reached the different 
conclusion that in reality the applicant had been granted indefinite temporary release, not a 
series of separate monthly releases, which was revoked when he was returned to Mountjoy 
Prison: hence the relevance to his case of the decision in The State (Murphy) v Kielt.
4. The Finn decision.
Some trial judges have incorporated a review element into the sentence they impose. Thus, an 
offender might be sentenced to seven years imprisonment, to be reviewed after 36 months 
with a view determining whether the remainder of the sentence could be suspended. One 
purpose served by such a sentencing structure is that it allows the court to take account of the 
offender’s progress in prison and if it is satisfactory to give him or her the benefit of such 
progress. However, there is also a suspicion that of a sentence of this type has the darker 
attraction of preventing the executive from releasing the prisoner prior to the review date and 
that it amounts to a judicial attempt to counteract the “revolving door” phenomenon. The 
superior courts have condemned this sentencing practice on the grounds, inter alia, that such 
sentences seek to “freeze” the exercise of executive discretion.176
The matter was definitively resolved by the Supreme Court in The People (DPP) v Finn,177
where the Court rejected the idea that the trial court when imposing the appropriate sentence 
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for an individual case could also include a review date for possible release on licence. Keane 
CJ explained that:178
“The making of such orders is not merely inconsistent with the provisions of s. 23 of 
the Act of 1951: it offends the separation of powers in this area mandated by Article 
13.6 of the Constitution. That provision expressly vests the power of commutation or 
remission in the President but provides that the power may also be conferred by law 
on other authorities. Since under Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution the sole and 
exclusive power of making laws for the State is vested in the Oireachtas, it was for 
the legislative arm alone to determine which authorities other than the President 
should exercise that power. In enacting s. 23 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1951, the 
Oireachtas conferred the power of commutation or remission on the government or, 
where it delegated its power, the Minister for Justice…It would seem to follow that 
the remission power, despite its essentially judicial character, once vested under the 
Constitution in an executive organ, cannot, without further legislative intervention, be 
exercised by the courts.”
Nevertheless, he offered the opinion that: 179
“It is also, of course, open to the Oireachtas to provide by legislation, as has been 
done in other countries, for the regular review of sentences by a parole board and 
such an approach might well be consistent with modern penological principles. These 
again, however, are entirely matters for the legislature and not within the competence 
of the courts, having regard to Article 13.6, to determine.”
This passage provides the Oireachtas with the reassurance that it is constitutionally 
permissible to enact legislation establishing a system of sentence review by an independent 
statutory body. It may be inferred that the Court was fully aware of the demands of sentence 
management and the desirability of providing a mechanism for the determination of life 
sentences:180 hence the reference to “modern penological principles.” 
5. Compatibility with ECHR.
Jurisprudence emerging from the ECtHR concerning the determination of life sentences is 
particularly relevant since the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 
2003. Rulings by the Court on the temporary release or release on licence of life sentence 
prisoners strongly indicate that Irish law is not compatible with the ECHR. 
The most significant deficiency in Irish law is that release is treated as an executive matter, a 
position that is in marked contrast to the position in European human rights law. Article 5(4) 
ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR, demands that a court or “court-like” body should be 
entrusted with the release of life sentence prisoners. The key features of such a body is that it 
is independent of the executive and of the parties, that it has the power to determine cases, 
that it conducts adversarial hearings and accords to the prisoner the procedural rights that 
178
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follow from such a hearing. The chasm between the Irish position and that required by the 
ECHR would appear to be insurmountable given the Irish courts’ reliance on considerations 
of separation of powers as underpinning their reluctance to engage in sentence review. 
However, this does not mean that there is a constitutional impediment to transferring the 
power of release from the executive to a body that matches ECHR demands. As it happens 
the judgment in The People (DPP) v Finn,181 quoted above, has opened the door to a 
development of the type required by ECtHR jurisprudence. 
The current Parole Board, which was established in 2001 on an administrative basis replacing 
the former Sentence Review Group, fails to satisfy ECHR requirements. The difficulty is that 
the Parole Board has been established on a temporary non-statutory basis and lacks the power 
to determine cases: its role is merely advisory. Despite its non-statutory basis it is likely that 
the manner in which the Parole Board conducts its deliberations is open to judicial review. Its 
predecessor, the Sentence Review Group has been successfully challenged in judicial review 
proceedings.182 However, ECtHR decisions have firmly indicated that judicial review 
proceedings do not provide the form of review required by the Convention:183 a mechanism 
that allows the review body to consider the factual basis for the continued detention of the 
life sentence prisoner is necessary.
6. Irish Law Summarised.
The position of life sentences in Irish law in relation to the ECHR may be summarised thus:
• Irish sentencing law is centred on the principle of proportionality and rejects the 
notion that a sentence may incorporate a preventative element in the interests of 
public protection;
• in theory, life sentences are purely punitive without any preventative element; 
nevertheless the Criminal Justice Act 1960 provides a framework for temporary 
release of, inter alia, life sentence prisoners: once that possibility exists ECHR 
requirements apply;
• under Irish law the issue of release is exclusively a matter for the executive, which 
enjoys a “wide discretion” in the matter: this position conflicts with the ECHR which 
insists that release be determined by a court or “court-like” body;
• in its current guise, the Parole Board, whose function is merely advisory, is not a 
court or “court-like” body; and
• Irish law will quash an executive decision on release on the limited grounds that it is 
“arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable”; the ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR, 
requires a broader form of review that is not satisfied by the domestic remedy of 
judicial review.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The central contention in this report is that the current regime governing the determination of 
life sentences in Ireland is incompatible with the ECHR, principally on the ground that the 
decision to release is entrusted to the executive rather than a court or “court-like” body as is 
envisaged by the Convention. 
It is clear that legislation is necessary to bring Irish law into line with European human rights 
requirements. Whether it is open to the Oireachtas to enact a law that authorises the 
imposition of sentences that incorporate an element of preventative detention, akin to the 
position in the United Kingdom, is debatable and, in any event, is beyond the scope of this 
report. Suffice it to say that such a measure is liable to face constitutional challenge, which in 
turn would involve a consideration of the constitutional status of the principle of 
proportionality and of the corresponding opposition to preventative sentencing. However, 
two other measures are available to make Irish law consistent with the ECHR. 
The first is to abandon the mandatory life sentence for murder and to replace it with a 
discretionary sentence. It has been noted that the mandatory life sentence is difficult to 
reconcile with the principle of proportionality and it is somewhat surprising that it has not yet 
been the subject of constitutional challenge.184 The Law Reform Commission has 
recommended that mandatory sentences be abolished and it has canvassed possible reform 
measures.185 Nevertheless, in that event the question of temporary release from a determinate 
sentence would still fall to be considered in the light of ECHR requirements and, as things 
stand, the regime is open to the same objections that the current law attracts.
The second strategy, which might be adopted either alone or in conjunction the abolition of 
the mandatory life sentence, is to enact legislation that transfers the function of release from 
the executive to an independent body. The Irish courts have invoked the separation of powers 
in support of their reluctance to engage in the review of sentences but that does not inhibit the 
enactment of the appropriate legislation. The words of Keane CJ in The People (DPP) v Finn
are worth repeating:186
“It is also, of course, open to the Oireachtas to provide by legislation, as has been 
done in other countries, for the regular review of sentences by a parole board and 
such an approach might well be consistent with modern penological principles. These 
again, however, are entirely matters for the legislature and not within the competence 
of the courts, having regard to Article 13.6, to determine.”
This opinion provides a clear constitutional mandate for the creation of an agency that 
satisfies the ECHR requirement of being a court or “court-like” body. As it is currently 
structured, the Parole Board fails to meet that requirement. However, were the Board to be 
placed on a statutory footing and assigned the function of determining applications for 
temporary release, rather than merely advising the Minister, Irish law would be brought into 
harmony with the ECHR. In the absence of legislative action it is only a matter of time before 
successful proceedings are initiated before the European Court for Human Rights. 
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